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Cutting taxes is a largely ineffective strategy for attracting
foreign investment.
by Blog Admin
Closer co-operation between eurozone members on tax policies might undermine the
attempts of some European states to use tax competition as a method for attracting
investment. Taking the case of Ireland and the Netherlands, Aidan Regan assesses the link
between low corporate taxes and investment, arguing that the impact of tax cuts has largely
been overstated. In some cases high tax rates might actually increase the potential for
investment if the revenue is used to improve infrastructure, or produce a more educated
workforce.
The eurozone crisis has hastened the move toward increased f iscal integration among member-states,
ref lected in the f iscal stability pact, and the proposed measures f or a centralised authority to monitor
national budgetary decisions. This move toward a f iscal union is widely accepted as necessary to embed
and stabilise the monetary union. The polit ics of  this integration process, however, are deeply contested,
particularly in relation to the proposed European f inancial transaction tax. Countries such as Ireland, the
Netherlands and the UK have used tax competit ion as a strategy to increase f oreign direct investment
(FDI), which has become a lynchpin of  their economic development models. The UK is unlikely to become
part of  any f iscal union. It is probably saf e to assume that the Conservative government would be more
likely to pull out of  the European Union than accept increased ‘interf erence’ in national budgetary
decisions. They are not members of  the eurozone, will never accept a Federal Europe, and will continue
to pursue tax competit ion as a strategy to lure corporate f inanciers and investment to the City of
London.
This is not the case f or the Dutch and
Irish governments. They must accept
increased f iscal centralisation,
enhanced f iscal co-ordination, and
potentially a f inancial transaction tax
across the single European market if
they are to remain members of  the
eurozone. This will put increased
pressure on their tradit ional strategy
of  using tax competit ion as a
mechanism f or economic development.
Or what Wolf gang Streeck once
described as a crude combination of
nationalism and neoliberalism. The
Irish, in particular, given their proximity
to the UK, and their shared liberal
market institutions, are publicly
opposed to a f inancial transaction tax
and aggressively def end their low
corporate tax regime (12.5 per cent) in
European negotiations. This def ence of  the low corporate tax regime unites all the mainstream polit ical
parties, business lobby groups, trade unions, policy-makers and mass media because it is assumed that
low taxes attract f oreign direct investment, which is crucial f or economic and employment growth. But do
low taxes really af f ect the FDI decisions made by multinational corporations (MNCs)?
According to the OECD, corporate and income tax ref orms are crucial to maintaining inward investment in
an era of  capital mobility and globalisation. National governments must lower taxes to attract capital
investment, ensure job creation and attract human capital. This assumption has underpinned the tax
ref orms of  the United States since the 1980s and the European Union since the 1990s. It is a policy
discourse that is particularly strong in liberal market economies such as Ireland, the UK, US, New Zealand
and Eastern and Central Europe. But a recent paper by Prof  Jensen, f rom Washington University, t it led
‘Fiscal Policy and the Firm: Do Low Corporate Tax Rates Attract Multinational Corporations?‘ directly
challenges these assumptions. Using a variety of  methods to compare 19 OECD countries, he concludes
that tax policy has no discernible impact on FDI f lows. Sweeping tax ref orms are not associated with
substantial changes in FDI f lows, and the impact of  globalisation is signif icantly over-estimated. This is
not to say that domestic tax ref orms do not matter f or investment, but the priority accorded to them by
polit icians is radically over stated.
This conclusion builds upon a comparative polit ical economy literature in polit ical science that specif ically
examines the strategy of  corporate f irms in making investment decisions, and the interactive ef f ect of
institutions and polit ics on f iscal policy outcomes. This research illustrates that tax decisions are
predominately the result of  domestic polit ics, not f unctional pressures associated with capital mobility
and globalisation. The implication is that governments can pursue alternative strategies to attract inward
investment. For example, if  high tax rates provide f or an educated workf orce, high wages, a well-
developed inf rastructure, or other public goods, multinational corporations may choose high tax
countries rather than low tax countries as an investment location (or at least not threaten to leave if
corporate tax rates are increased). This high-value added strategy is something that member-states of
the eurozone could pursue. But it would require countries such as Ireland to stop marketing themselves
as a low-tax country to f oreign investors (i.e. using tax competit ion as a strategy f or economic
development).
Although low taxes may have less impact on investment decisions than we assume, they certainly shape
where f irms declare prof its. This is the real problem f acing Ireland. The Irish have the second best trade
surplus in the eurozone, and productivity per worker is three times higher than Germany. Multinational
corporations in Ireland make f our t imes as much prof it per employee than the European average (US
MNCs make €240,000 per employee compared to €32,100 in other EU countries). Pre-tax prof its of  the
manuf acturing sector are ten times higher than other European countries. This is what underpins the
perception that Ireland is bouncing back f rom the crisis, and that austerity and export led growth are
complementary. The truth of  this f airy- tale is that US multinational corporations are engaged in transf er
pricing. They locate prof its in Ireland to take advantage of  the low corporate tax regime. The Irish
government is stuck in a path dependent strategy of  using tax policy as a mechanism f or taking credit f or
new investment in the country. In reality, they have constructed a tax haven f or US MNCs, not a strategy
f or employment creation. This is simply not sustainable in a f uture polit ical union of  eurozone member-
states.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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1. Europe is now stuck in a f iscal trap, brought about by the f ailure of  orthodox economics to
provide an ef f ective strategy f or economic growth. (7.1)
2. A purely intra-euro rebalancing strategy has limits. The ECB should consider policies to achieve a
weaker euro by a more accommodative monetary policy. (6.3)
3. If  we are to prevent another lost decade, we need macroeconomic policies to restore economic
activity, and public investment to power sustained and productive growth. (6.8)
